The Effect of The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation on the Global Health Field : An innovating Foundation in a Fragmented World by Søreide, Frode Hovland
  
 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  O S L O  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES                                                TIK    
 
 
Centre for technology,  
innovation and culture P.O. 
BOX 1108 Blindern 
N-0317 OSLO 
Norway 
http://www.tik.uio.no 
 
 
ESST 
The European Inter-University 
Association on Society, Science and 
Technology 
http://www.esst.uio.no 
 
The ESST Master Thesis 
 
The Effect of The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation on the Global Health 
Field – An Innovating Foundation in a Fragmented World 
 
Frode Hovland Søreide 
University of Oslo 
Society, Science and Technology in Europe 
Innovation, Globalisation and Policy 
2010 
Word count:17107 
  
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frode Hovland Søreide 
frodehso@student.sv.uio.no 
Specialization: TIK 4021. Globalisation, Innovation and Policy 
Supervisor: Magnus Gulbrandsen 
Word Count: 17107 
Key words: Gates Foundation, Global Health, Sectoral Systems of Innovation, 
 Principal-Agent Theory 
 
  
 
 Acknowledgements 
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Magnus Gulbrandsen, whose 
inspiration and expert guidance have been invaluable. I would also like to express my 
enormous gratitude to all the interviewees who have given up their valuable time to speak to 
me, and without which this case study could not have been realized. I am greatly indebted to 
The University of Oslo and NIFU STEP who enabled me to go to Geneva and Seattle to 
conduct the interviews. Finally I want to thank my family and friends for their inspiration and 
support throughout the process. 
Any errors or shortcomings contained in this paper are entirely my own responsibility. 
 
Frode Hovland Søreide 
Oslo, 02.10.2010 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
The purpose of this case study was to take a broad look at the effects of the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation Global Health Program’s science, technology and innovation funding and 
policies on the ever changing scene of global health. Using sectoral systems of innovation and 
innovation in non-profit organizations as frameworks the foundations ability to absorb 
information and put it to use for the purpose of innovation was investigated. Due to its 
integral role in any situation where tasks are delegated, principal agent theory was used to 
investigate how they align their goals with those of their grantees. Finally possible 
implications for Science, Technology and Innovation strategies (intentionally or 
unintentionally) caused by the vast amount of money that the Gates Foundation has 
contributed to the field of health research, product development and also procurement and 
implementation were discussed. I argue that the Gates Foundation has had a massive impact 
on funding of innovation in the global health field, and the results of this funding are starting 
to emerge. A noticeable finding is the foundation’s ability to bring diverse actors together and 
marshal support for its initiatives. Furthermore, while the foundation appears to have been 
very successful in its dealing with the principal agent problem, they struggle to efficiently 
absorb information from their surroundings in terms of markets and partners, which could 
impact negatively on their ability to innovate. 
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1. Introduction 
The overall objective of the thesis is to give an answer to the main research question: How does The Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation‟s Global Health Program affect innovation and innovation policy in the 
global health field? This is a difficult question to answer and no doubt one that deserves more detailed 
treatment than can be provided in this thesis. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (from now on 
referred to as the Gates Foundation or the foundation) is a complex organization that operates in a still 
more complex field. As waypoints on the route to tackling the question posed above, five more questions 
are posed in the literature chapter below. These concern different aspects of the Gates Foundation, 
specifically: how does the foundation fund science, technology and innovation; how does is acquire 
information to do so in an effective manner; how does it set its priorities; how do these affect policies in 
global health; and how does the foundation deal with the principal agent problem? Having dealt with 
these issues, it should then be possible to answer the principal question of how the foundation affects 
innovation and innovation policy in the global health field 
Although there are many aspects that could have been chosen, this sample of questions should 
serve to give a broad overlook at the Gates Foundations operations. The advantage of this strategy is that 
it gives a sort of birds eye perspective of the foundation, that would be lost if I had chosen to look at one 
restricted aspect of its activities.  
  The Gates Foundation‟s Global Health Program has to date, with a few exceptions, received little 
attention in scholarly articles. Its central role in global health is often mentioned, but rarely discussed at 
length. Nor are the effects of the massive funding it contributes investigated, especially in terms of its 
effects on innovation and policy. For this reason it makes sense to start with a broad look at the 
foundation that can lead to further research into more specific areas at later stages. 
In answering these questions I have largely relied on a sectoral system of innovation. I have also 
drawn on the theory of innovation in non-governmental organizations, theory on absorptive capacity and 
principal agent theory. Together these theories should give a starting point from which to understand the 
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complexities of the foundation. The main source of information used in the analysis is interviews 
conducted with people, most of whom work in organizations that receive funding from the Gates 
Foundation, and others who either work in the same field or have themselves studied the Gates 
Foundation.  
The thesis consists of five chapters excluding this short introduction. The second chapter is thus 
the literature review that describes the theories that are applied for the purpose of studying the 
foundations in terms of its effects on science technology and policy. The third chapter is a description and 
short history of the Gates Foundation and its context. The context gives a description of the global health 
field and the changes that are taking place in it, and is important for the understanding of the Gates 
Foundation and the role it plays in global health. The fourth chapter is devoted to the method applied for 
this case study of the Gates Foundation. The fifth part is a detailed analysis of the findings from the 
interviews; these are compared and contrasted with material from journal and newspaper articles, web 
pages etc. The sixth and final section contains a set of concluding remarks that seeks to summarize the 
findings of the five initial questions, thereby answering the main research question of the thesis. The 
appendix contains a list of abbreviations and acronyms, and the interview guides. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The purpose of the literature review is to establish a practical framework to understand the impact of a 
large foundation that is working in the global health field. There are multiple ways that this can be 
achieved. The topics covered below represent a few select perspectives that should be appropriate to start 
such an undertaking, but is by no means the only approach. Throughout the literature review five 
questions will be posed to aid the process of analyzing the findings and contribute to answering the main 
research question.  
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A short introduction of the concept of innovation is followed by five sections that have been 
chosen to assist the broad analysis of the foundation‟s impact in innovation and policy. The first section 
dealing with innovation in nonprofit organizations provides a perspective suitable for understanding how 
the funding for STI is approached internally, while the following section will place the foundation in a 
systemic context and also looks at absorptive capacity. The section on science technology and innovation 
policy will then provide a framework to enhance the understanding of the implication of the Gates 
Foundations funding strategies. The final section looks at some of the problems associated with principal 
agent theory, which have implications for all relationships where tasks are delegated. 
 
2.1 Innovation 
Innovative behavior follows from human‟s intrinsic motivation to improve tried ways of doing things. 
Innovation is often seen as the process of turning an invention into practice, whether this is in way of a 
new product or new practices. For this to happen a prospective innovator  (a firm, individual or other 
agent) will need to “(...) combine several types of knowledge, capabilities, skills and 
resources”(Fagerberg, 2005, p. 5). Furthermore, innovations should not be treated as a homogenous thing, 
but rather more dynamic and lengthy process(Fagerberg, 2005). An innovation can be defined or 
identified by the newness of the idea, practice or object where it is introduced, rather than whether or not 
it is a whole new concept to the world(Slappendel, 1996)  
Innovation in this paper is defined in its broadest terms, thus; any new products, processes and 
ideas applied to global health spending, research funding and innovation or distribution of products. Such 
a definition of innovation is useful in terms of global health in particular, because significant innovations 
can come in the form of new institutional setups, just as well as the invention of new drugs or other 
interventions.  
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2.2 Innovation in Non-Profit Organization 
Foundations belong under the umbrella of non-profit organizations (together with clubs and cooperative 
associations, among others). Historically, the focus of innovation studies has primarily been on private- 
for profit organizations (Zimmermann, 1999). In this paper, just as in Zimmermann, the assumption is 
that non-profit organizations (NPOs) also play a significant role in the economy, specifically in 
innovating new products for low revenue markets in the developing world, as with for example drug 
discoveries and distribution of new products.  
Zimmermann claims that although there has been little research done on the effects of innovation 
outside the private sector, the other large sectors, such as that of NPOs and the public sector also play an 
important role in promoting the well being of the individual, which is „the final objective of all economic 
activity‟, and as such deserves to be carefully analyzed. Zimmermann‟s article considers the general role 
of innovation in NPOs in the German case, but its findings are relevant to innovation in foundations in the 
global health field, nonetheless. As the article is concerned with the role of innovation in high income 
countries it is assumed that there are no constraints on the availability of capital or labor, making the 
combination of new products and processes , hence innovation,  the factor that allows the economy to 
move ahead of competing economies(Zimmermann, 1999). While the assumptions about limitless capital 
and labor is unrealistic in the global health field, the conclusion that innovation can be a significant 
driving force is certainly of importance, perhaps particularly because funding is still scarce. Zimmermann 
also assumes that innovation can attract „the necessary factors of production‟, in his case, from inside or 
outside the country in question. In global health the same principle could be true, for example if 
innovation can create new markets for therapeutics. The significance of foundations in the global health 
field(as an example of NPOs) is underscored by multiple articles(Kickbusch, 2000; McCoy, Chand, & 
Sridhar, 2009; McCoy, Kembhavi, Patel, & Luintel, 2009; NKCHS, 2010; Walt & Buse, 2000). 
In the same article Zimmermann discusses how NPOs could through innovation and growth 
bridge the gap left by a public sector rendered increasingly impotent by the effects of globalization which 
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have limited the political freedom of action of countries. The extent to which this is true in the global 
health field is hard to asses, as, paradoxically, the globalization can be seen as one of the reasons for the 
growing involvement of foundations in global health 
It has been assumed that the NPO sector has been less efficient as it lacks incentive in form of 
profits; however, Zimmermann states that many modern NPOs are “characterized by a strong motivation, 
freedom of ideas and competition among ideas”. In terms of environmental factors, borrowing from 
Zimmermann, I assume that „lack of finances, the degree of competition, the possibility of protecting 
from the risk of innovation etc‟ is of importance for innovation in a foundation. As foundations lack the 
profit making incentive Zimmermann mentions personal and social acknowledgement as such an 
incentive. Since foundations are otherwise lacking in extrinsic incentive it needs to be substituted by an 
intrinsic incentive. The extent to which this is relevant to the unit of analysis in this thesis will be 
discussed later. 
According to Zimmermann NPOs are engaged in different fields of activities. The fields of 
activities can be defined in terms of output which is to a degree determined by the mission of the 
organization. Outputs can vary from production of public goods, private goods to advocacy and others. 
The types of output that a foundation wants to see should therefore strongly influence what it chooses to 
fund.  
In this context it is natural to ask: How does the Gates Foundation fund science, technology and 
innovation? 
Zimmermann (1999) states that it is simple to discern who the innovating person is, both in private 
and non-profit organization; that is, in Schumpeterian terms the entrepreneur. However, the foundation is 
complex with many levels of decision making. It should be noted that the individualist perspective of 
innovation has been criticized. While entrepreneurs are important this perspective might be simplistic as it 
assumes that innovative ideas originate with, and are developed by one individual. Other studies have 
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emphasized the importance of leaders and elite groups for innovation in organizations(Slappendel, 1996). 
It seems likely that innovations in a foundation could stem from multiple sources before they are 
integrated as new ideas into the organization. Cooperation and communication with recipient 
organizations, recipient countries, supra-national institutions, other NGOs, or ideas from people living 
with diseases could all lead to innovation, as well as intra-organizational communication. Due to the 
complexity of the global health arena and the foundations working within it, it seems that a system 
perspective that focuses “(...) on the workings of the linkages of the system” (Fagerberg, 2005 p13) is 
more pertinent for the purpose of this thesis than the individualistic approach.  
 
2.3 Sectoral system of innovation 
The systemic view of innovation is a derivative of evolutionary economics with its emphasis on 
dynamics, processes and transformation. The particular model of systems of innovation, takes a sectoral, 
rather than a geographical perspective. This is an advantage when studying organizations that operates on 
a global level, with a multitude of partners from a variety of fields. 
The systemic view of innovation recognizes the process of innovation as a collective achievement, 
not only as the accomplishment of an individual entrepreneur, and emphasizes the importance of 
collaboration of both public and private sectors. Hence, innovation is not solely made possible by the 
organization from which it originates but is dependent on an infrastructure that can facilitate or constrain 
the process of innovation(Van de Ven, 1999). 
The main components of this infrastructure in a sectoral system of innovation are, according to 
Malerba, (2002) “knowledge and learning processes; basic technologies, inputs and demand with key 
links and dynamic complementarities; types and structure of interactions among heterogeneous firms and 
non-firms organizations; institutions and the processes of selection and generation of variety” Importantly 
this infrastructure is characterized by a large degree of dynamism and varying levels of aggregation and 
communication between organizations and individuals that constitutes that sector, and can change over 
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time. Actors in the sector interact and relate in various ways: they both compete and co-operate, and 
communication between them can be inhibited or facilitated by rules and regulations. The actors are 
heterogeneous in nature, have differing objectives and behavior, and exhibit differing learning processes.  
The interactions of actors in a sectoral system will have reciprocal effect on the agents, in that decisions 
made by one actor will leave a mark on the sector and thereby affect others. This process, termed co-
evolution, drives change in the sector, and is dependent on the key components mentioned above. 
In addition to rules and regulations, a sector‟s innovative behavior and interaction will also be 
limited by what basic technologies are available, and demand for the products. The firms are, according to 
Malerba(2002), the key actors in a sectoral system and can take the roles of innovators and producers, but 
also the implementers and users of new products. Importantly the firms are also important for the 
generation and accumulation of new knowledge. The demand side can easily be misconceived as 
constituting merely of individuals buying products for themselves; but it can also be represented by firms, 
lending heterogeneity to the demand-side agents in a sector. Sharp changes in demand can result in 
changes in the technology and has implications for the learning processes of actors involved in the sector.  
These changes in demand, or demand discontinuities, have important implications for the structure of a 
sector. These in turn can cause firms and organizations to flourish or fall, and hence drive the evolution of 
the sector(Malerba, 2002).According to Malerba, “These results emphasize the need to examine the 
possible tradeoffs and complementarities between knowledge about technologies and knowledge about 
demand” 
The next question posed is thus: How does the gates foundation use demand to direct their funding 
of science technology and innovation? 
As the acquisition of knowledge would be of critical importance for any foundation working in the 
field of global health this next section will deal with absorptive capacity and the relationship between 
learning and innovation. According to Cohen and Levinthal(1990), who deals with this question 
predominantly from the perspective of firms, the acquisition integration and use of information from the 
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external environment is critical to the firm‟s innovative capabilities. In this thesis this principle is 
extended to include foundations.  This ability to acquire information and learn, labeled absorptive 
capacity is, according to Cohen and Levinthal, to a great degree dependent on prior knowledge that is 
already present in the organization. This, it is argued, is because to understand the full potential of newly 
acquired knowledge a thorough understanding of its context is needed. This learning then becomes a 
matter of being able to learn, or the process of learning to learn. Hence, learning is an accumulative 
process.  
In an organization, the ability to learn and acquire information is dependent on the organizational 
subsections‟ ability to learn and, in logical conclusion, the ability of individuals within the organization to 
learn. That is not to say that the absorptive capacity of an organization is merely the sum of the abilities of 
individuals. Structural and organizational arrangements can facilitate or impede absorptive capacity. 
Thus, the organization‟s ability to learn depends on gatekeepers who stand either at organization‟s 
interface with the environment, or at the interface between its subunits of the organization. The 
gatekeepers can capture information, and subsequently integrate and disseminate the newly acquired 
knowledge within the organization. The ease with which this dissemination can happen depends, yet 
again, on the prior knowledge of the recipients. Given that the prior knowledge held by these individuals 
is not sufficient for the integration of new knowledge, such as may be the case in highly technical issues, 
the gatekeepers may have to act as translators to make the information useful for others. This is what 
Cohen and Levinthal call boundary spanning roles. While this may be time consuming, it is according to 
Cohen and Levinthal important that there is a degree of diversity in the knowledge held by the individuals 
in an organization, but with enough overlap to make communication and use of new knowledge possible. 
It follows that an organization‟s absorptive capacity is to an extent path dependent , whereby the diversity 
of prior knowledge will to some degree determine what new knowledge the organization is capable of 
absorbing.  
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The importance of absorptive capacity is underscored by the observation that on an organizational 
level innovation is mostly a product of borrowing, not invention of itself. However, it does appear that 
R&D activities can themselves help to increase the organization‟s absorptive capacity.  
The third question for the purpose of the analysis is therefore: How does the Gates Foundation 
communicate with, and acquire information from its partners and grantees? 
 
2.4 Foundations and Policy 
This section has so far dealt with what influences innovation in foundations. This next section looks at 
how funding policy for science technology and innovation might affect the field it aims to influence.  
From Benkt-Åke Lundvall and Susana Borrás we can draw out the general statement that Science, 
Technology and Innovation Policy are essentially about what governments “(...) could do to promote the 
production, diffusion, and use of scientific and technological knowledge in order to realize national 
objectives”(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005 p599). By substituting government with foundations, and national 
objectives with global objectives, the same framework can be used to investigate the impact of a large 
foundation on the global health field. The assumption is that this is justified when looking at a foundation 
of considerable size and influence. This means that when the financial and political influence of a given 
foundation is taken into account, it can have a significant impact on the outcomes we can expect to see in 
terms of innovation in the global health arena.  
  I will for the sake of simplicity, like Lundvall and Borrás, treat Science policy, technology policy 
and innovation Policy as three idealized examples, rather than a singular concept. Due to the complexity 
of the foundations operations many of the issues that they are involved in will inevitably span all three of 
these issues and they will not always be clearly distinguishable. The main research question of this thesis 
only includes the words „Innovation Policy‟ as it according to Lundvall and Borrás‟ framework 
encompasses both science and technology policy.    
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2.5 Science policy 
It can be safely assumed that a foundation working to advance scientific understanding in the global 
health arena must have as its key objective the strengthening of the knowledge base of health sciences. As 
with governments, then, the main issue is to  “[allocate] sufficient resources to science, to distribute them 
wisely between activities, to make sure that resources are used efficiently and contribute to social 
welfare”(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005 p605).  An important and ongoing debate in Science Policy is to what 
extent political meddling is positive for the outcome of research. One danger is that too much political 
steering of scientists and the scientific community could stifle creativity and limit the diversity of views 
held by scientist in regards to new ideas. University scholars have, according to Lundvall and Borrás, 
been champions of free, autonomous research: they argue that the innovative ideas that drive radical 
change can only ever arise from basic research that is allowed to develop independently of political and 
strategic goals.  
Another danger is that democracy is undermined in an environment where science is not allowed 
„free reins‟, as  independent scientific discovery is essential to secure a transparent and open 
society(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005 p 606).  
Careful evaluation is important to assess where money can be spent most efficiently. It can also 
create incentives for scientists. As Lundvall and Borrás point out, scientists undergo several types of 
evaluations, from exams to peer reviews. However, policy makers might not regard these internal 
evaluations are sufficient to ensure effective use of research funding, and like in the UK impose further 
reporting systems. While these measures might be effective in the short term it has led to dissatisfaction 
among scientist(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005 p607). 
Another interesting question raised by Lundvall and Borrás is whether good research is always 
useful. The evidence they refer to is contradictory and some researchers have even found evidence that 
there is a negative correlation between high profile publishing and high impact, at least within biotec 
(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005 p.608).  
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2.6 Technology Policy 
The approach to technology policy differs between low income countries and high income countries. 
While High income countries will be concerned with developing techniques to bring the latest innovation 
to market, low- income countries will be more concerned with catching up, by entering into new 
promising fields of industry, or absorbing those new innovations that are made available. (Lundvall & 
Borrás, 2005 p608).  
The question is raised whether it is true that we should always give first priority to science- and 
technologically based sectors, over other sectors, and if so at what time is it appropriate to support such 
sectors? For the instance, is it only acceptable to support for pre-competitive stages or whether it is also 
acceptable to help bring a product to market 
Lundvall and Borrás state that  for governments “Technology policy may be pursued with 
competence where government operates as a major user but when it comes to developing new 
technologies for the market it must be more modest”(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005 p.609). The concern is that 
over-zealous governments make decisions for the trajectory of technology that are out of tune with the 
market or the population. These issues should arguably also be a concern for major investors into drug 
development outside government, such as foundations. 
 
2.7 Innovation Policy 
As markets seem to continuously fail to provide efficient drugs and therapies for neglected diseases that 
are mainly affecting the poor there appears to be a strong argument for innovation policies that can 
strengthen the outcome of technological opportunities. From the systemic perspective on innovation 
policy “(...)most  major policy fields need to be considered in the light of how they contribute to 
innovation”(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005 p.611). While acknowledging the importance of competition the 
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systemic view of innovation recognizes the importance of communication between producers, consumers 
and even competitors, and focuses on the long-term outcome of innovation policies, emphasizing the 
importance of organizations and institutions. Foundations may be able to both influence and change 
institutional structures, though in a different manner to governments. Regulation of IPRs and provision of 
venture capitals are among the tools that can be used to influence innovation policy. Importantly, with 
respect to foundations, innovation policy has mainly focused upon ways of promoting economic growth 
and competitiveness, some attention has also been paid to the promotion of “(...)‟social cohesion‟ and 
equality”(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005 p. 612).  
The fourth question is thus: What characterizes the Gates Foundation’s STI policies and how do 
they affect the global health field? 
 
2.8 Principal- Agent Theory 
 This section on principal agent theory primarily deals with how to incentivize scientists and efficiently 
implement policies. This is, according to Braun (2003) a double-edged problem of “how  to make sure 
that good and useful science is produced , as well as how to assure that the investments in science do not 
go with unproductive pressures from the government to produce applicable knowledge”, a description 
which  clearly has relevance to the discussion above. 
In this context, the principal agent problem arises when the funder (i.e. the principal) wants to pay 
for outcomes that may be a lower priority for the recipient (i.e. the agent). In other words, if the priorities 
of the two are misaligned, and the principal cannot perfectly control the behavior of the agent, how to 
ensure the latter acts at the behest of the former? At root, the problem is one of informational asymmetry 
arising from the degree of removal between policymakers and scientists. The functional differentiation of 
modern society, has been advantageous for knowledge creation, but has left politicians and policymakers 
with the responsibility of delegating the task of technological research to scientists. Policymakers, as 
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social utility maximisers  then have a duty to make sure that scientists carry out work that is in the best 
interest of society; but they are impeded by their limited ability to monitor the scientists‟ output, a 
constraint that the scientist can exploit to pursue their own potentially divergent ends. (Braun, 2003). This 
asymmetry leads to problems such as that of adverse selection and moral hazard. Moral hazard will be 
dealt with below. 
Up until the 1960‟s, science funding had, according to Braun (2003) been characterized by blind 
delegation. This rested on the idea that autonomous research would yield the best science; in effect, that 
in the absence of supervision, scientists would work in the best interests of society. Since then it has been 
a salient trait of funding to be linked to some overarching political objective by utilizing price signals. 
The purpose of these price signals is to incentivize scientists to align their goals with those of the funders. 
However, as Braun(2003) notes, the scientists “ have a genuine interest in pursuing their scientific career, 
which is not flexibly linked to the exigencies in political funding”. If the objectives of the funder are 
unequal or contradictory to those of the scientist this means that the scientist is incentivized to reduce 
their efforts or hide information from the funder. This infers a cost on the part of the funder because it 
means that monitoring will be of increased importance, to ensure the compliance of the agent(Van der 
Meulen, 1998). 
Indeed, as pointed out by Braun(1998) it is questionable whether it is at all possible for a 
layperson to guide science with external motivations and interests ,particularly if this is taken to mean to 
“influence the hierarchical intervention by political agencies determining and commanding scientific 
development.” 
While scientists undoubtedly respond to economic incentives, and capital is undeniably important 
for the functioning of the scientific system, it is social return that drives scientific research. This means 
that the types of science that yields the highest social capital will be of the highest interest to the 
scientists. 
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To overcome the principal agent problem inherent in the relationship between scientists and their 
political sponsors, Braun(2003) offers the solution of institutional embeddedness, achieved through a 
contractual framework. Specifically, contracts are drawn up in cooperation with research institutions and 
not scientists directly. The contracts will then serve to steer the scientists indirectly, as they are part of 
these institutions and their institutional embeddedness has been changed. Because the incentive mode of 
delegation is embedded in the research institutions this should mitigate the problem of moral hazard, as 
well as adverse selection and foster social responsibility. 
The ideal contract would be drawn up in such a way that it is in the interest of both parties to 
adhere to precise specifications of the contract. Such an ideal contract would “specify precisely what each 
party  is to do in every possible circumstance and arrange the distribution of realized costs and benefits in 
each contingency (including those where the contract‟s terms are violated) so that each party individually 
finds it optimal to abide by the contract‟s terms” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 127) as sited in (Braun, 
2003) 
Of course, such a complete contract is likely rendered impossible by the unpredictability of the 
directions scientific research can take. As it is impractical to draw up contracts that take account of every 
possible circumstance, relational contracting has been used in its place. This instead specifies “general 
provisions that are broadly applicable”(Braun, 2003), thereby giving the scientific institutions operational 
freedom, where the precise actions of the agent is not specified to every conceivable situation. 
Such contracting still leads to some cost on the part of the principal who will still have to be an 
integral part of the decision making process and will also have to monitor the progress of projects to make 
sure that the agent stays faithful to the contract 
As the principal agent relationship is integral to all funding of science technology and innovation, 
and correct handling of this relationship can dramatically affect the outcome of such research I pose the 
question: How does the gates foundation approach the principal agent problem? 
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3.The Gates Foundation and its Context 
 
 
3.1 A Short History of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (formerly The Bill H. Gates Foundation) has since its 
establishment in 1994 grown to become the largest foundation in the world. From its relatively modest 
start, having a total budget of 94 million USD, its size, impact and funding has increased at an impressive 
pace. Even though the Gates Foundation made mention of global health concerns such has child and 
infant health, family planning and population growth in their first annual report in 1998, there was no 
mention of the Global health program until the next years report. By 1999 the Global Health Program had 
been established as an integrated part of the foundation under the leadership of Gordon W. Perkin, the 
founder of Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH), one of the major recipients of Gates 
funds (BMGF, 1999). 
The fact that global health had become a central point of investment by 1999 is illustrated by the 
fact that the share of the budget directed towards this issue had increased to 49% of the foundations total 
funding. The lion‟s share of this money, 38 %, was awarded to vaccine preventable diseases(BMGF, 
1999). 
The Foundations global health program awarded 70 grants in its first year, totaling more than 1.2 
billion USD. Out of these 70 grants, 9 were awarded to vaccine preventable diseases, 48 to child and 
reproductive health and 13 to global health issues related to poverty. In 2009 it was reported(McCoy, 
Chand, et al.) that the Gates Foundation had become the third biggest funder of global health, surpassed 
only by the US and UK governments.  
  By 2008, its health budget had reached 1.8 billion USD (65% of total budget). In comparison the 
WHO budget of 2007 stood at 1.65 billion USD. McCoy, Kembhavi et al.(2009) calculated that the 
foundations global health program had in the period from 1998 to 2007 awarded grants totaling the value 
of 8.95 billion USD. Noticeably, in 2008 the Gates Foundation also received 1.8 billion USD from 
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Warren Buffett in the form of 451,250 shares of Berkshire Hathaway “B” stock which represent the 
largest outside contribution to the foundation to date.   
The Gates foundation continues to focus heavily on disease prevention and especially vaccinations 
as a tool to combat global health problems. As an aside, the annual reports give little information about 
the direct impact of the foundations funding, although it lists some of the achievements of their 
partnerships, such as the success of the Malaria Control and Evaluation Partnership in Africa, which cut 
the incidents of malaria in Zambia in half (BMGF, 2008). It is hard to say whether this reflect inherent 
difficulties in gathering such information or an unwillingness on the part of the foundation to release it.  
Their primary strategy is to support science, technology and innovation in fields they deem to 
have received too little attention and funding, and has the potential of having a significant impact on the 
quality of lives in poor countries. These include, among others, the development of treatments or 
prophylactics to diseases such as enteric and diarrheal diseases, HIV/AIDS, malaria, pneumonia and 
tuberculosis. They have defined a three point strategy used to achieve their goals, they are as follows: 
Discovery – Closing gaps in knowledge and science and creating critical platform technologies in 
areas where current tools are lacking. 
Delivery – implementing and scaling up proven approaches by identifying and proactively 
addressing the obstacles that typically lie in the path of adoption and uptake 
Policy & Advocacy– Promoting more and better resources, effective policies, and greater 
visibility of global health so that we may effectively address the foundation‟s priority health 
targets 
(BMGF, 2010a) 
The gates foundation makes use of a number of strategies to achieve these goals. A significant 
amount of the funds go towards general operating support of  global health partnerships such as the 
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Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis or GAVI. Other grants will be directed towards 
development of vaccines or other interventions through organizations such as path and the Medicines for 
Malaria Venture (McCoy, Kembhavi, et al., 2009). In addition to these grants that can at times be very 
large, the Gates Foundation has also established the Grand Challenges Exploration Program that awards 
grants of no more than 100,000 USD and aims to support “innovative, early-stage research to expand the 
pipeline of ideas that can lead to those much needed global health solutions”(BMGF, 2010c). 
Although the Gates Foundation has generally received acclaim for their work some critical 
remarks have been made. Most notably McCoy, Kembhavi et al.‟s article (2009) raises some critical 
questions about accountability. They point out the Gates Foundation‟s extensive network and potential 
influence over it. An example of this influence is seen in the foundations drive to eradicate 
malaria(Feachem & Sabot, 2008). McCoy, Kembhavi et al. also mention the unusual constellation of the 
H8, a self appointed group of global health leaders of which the Gates Foundation is a member, together 
with the WHO, The World Bank and others. Also, an LA Times article from 2007 by Pillers, Sanders and 
Dixon criticizes the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Trust (a separate legal entity) for unethical 
investment in companies whose operations are counterproductive to the goals of the foundation(Pillers, 
Sanders, & Dixon, 2007). 
 
3.2 Global health governance and fragmentation 
In this section I seek to describe the current state of the global heath arena, to clarify the environment in 
which the Gates Foundation operates. Clearly, they do not work in a vacuum, and as such, their actions 
will have multiple and ambiguous effects that reach far outside their own organization. Likewise, the 
actions of the myriads of actors in the field will impact on the foundation and affect the environment to 
which they relate. 
Global health governance in this paper follows the framework as lied out by Dodgson, Lee et 
al.(2002) “In broad terms, governance can be defined as the actions and means adopted by a society to 
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promote collective action and deliver collective solutions in pursuit of common goals.(…)” It follows 
then that health governance “concerns the actions and means adopted by a society to organize itself in the 
promotion and protection of the health of its population”. Finally, due to increasing globalization and the 
effects it has had on the nature of human interaction and collaboration, but also on disease, it has been 
necessary to change focus - from an international to a global perspective, in order to effectively combat 
health challenges.  
The WHO, a specialized agency under the UN- has since its creation in 1948 been the leader in 
establishing the normative framework for health. It has, among other things been the central agency for 
monitoring disease, advocating and establishing policy and providing countries with technical support. 
The WHO derives its strength from the mandate given to it through its member states who among other 
functions dictate policy and elects the Director General of the organization through the World Health 
assembly. 
In the late 90‟s early 2000‟s there was a growing concern, and several claims to the effect, that the 
Global Health arena was becoming increasingly fragmented. With a high number of new actors in the 
field, this led to a worry that the status of the World Health Organization‟s position as the leading 
authority on global health was being undermined. Walt and Buse (2000) claimed that “ Not only are the 
World Bank and the European Union increasingly playing a role, but so too are a number of important 
new philanthropic foundations and the private-for profit sector, such as the pharmaceutical industry.” 
These new partnerships have created an increasingly intricate network of collaborations all over the 
world, involving actors from a wide range of sectors. This change in global health governance is partly 
blamed on the WHO‟s lacking ability to deal with health challenges in the 90‟s. Walt and Buse raised the 
concern that “With priorities decided by small communities of experts often removed from the realities of 
programmme execution, the question arises who is setting the agenda in international health.” They add 
that the WHO‟s characteristics of universality and representation “are not reflected in public-private 
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partnerships which often have little low or middle income country representation, and lines of 
accountability upwards towards their sponsors rather than downward towards their recipients. 
Reich and Takemi raise similar concerns. They claim that the architectural changes of global 
health are diminishing the dominance of both the central funder; the World Bank, and the leader on 
normative issues; The WHO. “As noted in the World Bank‟s strategy document, the global health 
organisations who were once dominant are increasingly marginal and less influential. This tenet is true for 
both the World Bank‟s previous financial dominance and WHO‟s previous normative dominance”. Policy 
making in global health has as such become a multi-stakeholder process, but without an explicit 
institutional process and with competition and confusion both globally and nationally.” (Reich & Takemi, 
2009)  
An example that could in part be leading to such fragmentation is highlighted McCoy, Kembhavi 
et al.‟s article on the Gates Foundation‟s grants program (2009) where a self appointed group of health 
leaders have joined in the afore mentioned coalition called the H8 (no doubt a reference to the G8) that is 
composed of The Gates Foundation, The WHO, the World Bank, GAVI, the Global Fund, UNICEF, the 
UNFPA and UNAIDS. The Gates Foundation‟s relative influence is presumably strengthened given that 
they have representatives sitting on the board of both GAVI and the Global Fund. 
In addition the G8  and the G20 are, and could be, increasingly playing a role in global 
health(NKCHS, 2010). And according to Reich and Takemi (2009) “the G8 play a major part in 
catalyzing efforts to reframe the global health architecture in a more coherent direction.” According to 
McCoy (2009), the Gates Foundation has also been part of shaping the G8‟s health agenda. The 
Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre recently criticized the G20‟s increasing involvement in 
global affairs, and is worried that its lack of mandate and significant influence can serve to undermine the 
normative functions of the WHO(Ertel, 2010) 
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In its 2007 report on Health, Nutrition and Population Strategy the World Bank made particular 
mention of the great number of new actors in the field of Development Assistance for Health (DAH). 
Where once the bank itself was the leading funder of DAH, it is no one among many. Despite the great 
increase in funding (from 6 billion USD in 2000 to nearly 14 billion in 2005) the field is increasingly 
chaotic, and the Bank warns that if the flawed architecture of global health funding is not addressed we 
run the chance of squandering the opportunities of improving the health of the world‟s poorest. 
Similarly, the UK Department for International Development highlights three main issues that 
need to be resolved to improve the support for poor countries. A major issue is the complexity of the 
health assistance arena. They point to the current situation in which they have to work with over 40 
bilateral donors and 26 UN agencies, 20 global and regional funds and 90 global health initiatives. 
Secondly, and perhaps unsurprisingly this complexity carries a great cost for the developing countries. 
They point to the case of Zambia‟s health system which receives support from 15 major international 
partners. “(…) all of whom expect separate reports, meetings and time – time that would be better spent 
building the health system than on managing donors”. Their third concern relates to the relative 
underfunding of initiatives to strengthen health systems. Whereas initiatives to alleviate the impact of 
such diseases as HIV malaria and Tuberculosis have shown impressive results, health challenges that are 
best combated through more systemic approaches, such as child and maternal health, have received too 
little attention.(DFID, 2007) 
Concerns have also been raised regarding the way in which the money from this new found will to 
finance global health is spent. It is necessary to make sure that the funding now available is spent in areas 
where the recipients stand to benefit, rather than being high jacked by vested interest, such as the private 
for – profit sector. It is also important to ensure that funds are not diverted to expanding, expensive and 
unnecessarily bureaucratic institutions in the north (McCoy, Chand, et al., 2009) 
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This seems a very real concern for many countries that are already burdened by the growing 
number of actors and partnerships, each with their own application, monitoring and evaluation processes; 
Zambia being one example among many. 
3.2.1 Public private partnerships 
In recent years, with the diminishing role of the WHO, many Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have 
been established to lessen the burden of disease in the developing world. Some of the more prominent 
ones are GAVI, The Global Fund, Stop Tb and MMV, but many others exist. These  PPPs represent one 
of the significant causes of the increasingly fragmented field global health governance(Szlezák et al., 
2010). They also represent an example of The Gates Foundation‟s impact, as they both fund and sit on the 
board of all the PPPs mentioned above as well as others.(GAVI, 2010b, 2010c; GFATM, 2010a, 2010b; 
MMV, 2010a, 2010b; Stop-Tb, 2010a, 2010b) 
The goals of several of the PPPs have often been to provide already existing interventions to 
populations who have yet to benefit from these, while others, such as the Product Development 
Partnerships (PDPs), have focused on research for the development of new interventions.  
While many of these PPP‟s might possibly have an underlying goal of creating a market pull for 
the development of new interventions GAVI, with the help from Gates and others, has made their intent 
very obvious by establishing what they have termed Advanced Market Commitments. The first AMC to 
have been launched is intended to create a market stimulus for the development of a new pneumococcal 
vaccine. This represents a novel approach to health funding, and is an example of how innovation is not 
necessarily restricted to the development of new drugs, diagnostics etc(GAVI, 2010a). 
 
 
4. Method 
The case study is according to Yin(2009) appropriate as a method when the research is being done into a 
contemporary issue and the investigator has little control over the events as they take place. In addition 
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the case study is suitable when applying questions of „how‟ and „why‟. Also “(...)the case study method 
allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events(...)”(Yin, 2009, 
p. 4) Since all of these conditions are met in this paper I found it to be the preferable method of research. 
The Gates Foundation, as the unit of analysis was defined relatively late, after having decided 
upon Global health as a topic of interest. I found an extensive literature on global health policy and 
fragmentation within the field, but surprisingly little was written about what had become the largest 
philanthropic organization in the world. I assumed that a foundation so heavily focused upon scientific 
development to combat health problems would have a significant influence on innovation in this field, 
and this is what I wish to explore further in this paper. The relative scarcity of literature dedicated to 
innovation in not-for-profit organizations means that the paper must rely heavily on the interviews 
conducted with actors in the field. As this topic is political in nature I decided to make extensive use of 
Lundvall and Borrás‟ framework on STI policy extensively to say something about the policy 
implications of the works of the Gates Foundation. The size of the foundation, I believe, further justifies 
such a use.  
The research question in this paper is a „how‟ question. None the less it seems that my case study 
will benefit from both an exploratory and explanatory approach. The purpose of this case study is to 
understand the effect the Gates foundation has on Global Health governance, with specific reference to 
innovation. This research should in turn lead to further hypotheses and propositions for further 
study.(Yin, 2009, p. 9). Importantly, the case study does not aim to achieve any sort of statistical 
generalisability, but rather what Yin describes as analytical generalisability, which can be used as a 
template for further investigation. 
Due to the complexity of the unit of analysis and the environment in which it operates it has been 
vitally important to use multiple sources of evidence, such as journal papers, annual reports, web pages, 
etc to corroborate the findings from the interviews. 
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The research question for this paper is: How does the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation‟s Global 
Health Program affect innovation and innovation policy in the global health field? 
Due to the scarcity of research done into both not-for-profit NGO‟s and the Gates Foundation 
itself, I find it to be a research question that serves the purpose of this paper well. I have had the great 
fortune of being able to research the Gates Foundation at a time when its activities are gaining both 
attention and influence. Because of its contemporary nature I have focused on interviews as my main 
source of evidence, in addition to sources mentioned above. According to Yin, interviews are one of the 
unique strengths of the case study, and therefore a vitally important source of evidence when the 
researcher does not have the ability to manipulate the conditions of the field of research, such as is 
possible when dealing with controlled experiments (Yin, 2009, p. 11).  
The reason for including such an extensive explanation of the current Global health field and its 
fragmentation is related precisely to this inability to control the environment in which the Gates 
Foundation operates. It is obviously impossible to understand the activities of the foundation outside this 
environment. Nor is it possible to remove or alter this environment. In the words of Yin, the conditions of 
the global health arena are “highly pertinent to [my]phenomenon of study” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). 
After having studied the literature on the Gates foundation, the global health field and of 
innovation several questions were posed. The analysis of the interviews was then based around answering 
these questions.  
 
4.1 Construct Validity 
To maintain construct validity it has been important to define the relationships between concepts in a 
logical manner. This serves to link, for example „impact‟ to specific concepts such as „innovation‟, so as 
to demonstrate the rationale behind the operational measures. 
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The multiple sources should hopefully aid the construct validity and establish what Yin describes 
as a „chain of evidence‟. One weakness of this report is the lack of a draft case study report. 
 
4.2 Internal Validity 
Internal validity deals first and foremost with causal relationships. In this thesis however it is an important 
concept when it comes to making inferences. As with many case studies, it can be very hard to observe 
the causal relationships between different events, especially the causal direction. This is certainly the case 
in this study, and therefore inferences have to be made. To ensure internal validity it has therefore been 
vitally important to discuss the results of the interviews with both the sources and others. These 
discussions have had a great impact on this paper, and I owe a lot to my colleagues and other external 
sources. In particular, conversations with a source at the Norwegian Health Directorate and a former 
board member of GAVI and the Global Fund have been instrumental to my understanding of the global 
health arena and the Gates Foundation. 
 
4.3 External Validity 
As mentioned above, the case study at hand does not aim at any sort of statistical generalisability, but 
rather analytical generalisability. The Gates Foundation was chosen on the basis that it was believed to 
have an impact on innovation and policy making. To investigate to what extent the findings are 
generalizable to other organizations, one has to choose other units of analysis where conditions are 
similar. 
 
 
4.4 Reliability 
The purpose of reliability is to ensure the possibility of replication of the study. This means in theory that 
anyone repeating the study would find the same results. This is, I imagine, most useful for those who are 
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interested in doing further research into similar organizations, as a replication of a continuously 
developing organization such as the Gates Foundation is bound to yield different results over time. 
Importantly reliability serves to exclude biases and errors of the researcher. Reliability is achieved here 
by including the sources of information, as with references, so that any use of data can be scrutinized. 
Furthermore, I have included the interview guides in the appendix for review. The interviews are all 
based around the same topics, but differ slightly to suit the interviewee. The interviews have been 
transcribed as faithfully as possible and both audio files and transcripts are available upon request for 
anyone who wished to investigate them further. The statements made in the interviews have been 
discussed with others and compared to other sources to check for controversy and further strengthen 
reliability. 
 
 
4.5 Single Case Design 
The case study at hand is a single case study. Yin states that this type of design is justified when the unit 
of analysis represents such a unique example that it is difficult to find comparable cases. This could be 
said to be the case for The Gates Foundation. The foundation is certainly in a unique position in the world 
today, being by far the largest foundation both in terms of finances and impact as discussed above. The 
Gates Foundation has received relatively little attention and this study seeks to aid the understanding of 
how the foundation influences innovation and policy 
  However, it could be argued that other foundations have increasing amounts of influence, such as 
the Wellcome Trust, which certainly is a foundation deserving of further research. It might also be 
hypothesized that such a foundation could have similar, although probably to lesser extent, impact on 
innovation and policymaking. This could clearly be said to be a weakness of this thesis. However with its 
unique position, its complexity and scale it has been natural to limit this report to a single-case design.   
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4.5.1 Embedded Case Study 
To get a clearer view of the operations of the Gates Foundation it has been necessary to go beyond the 
organization itself, and interview a variety of groups receiving Gates funding. These cannot be said to 
exactly represent sub-units of the organization, but their inclusion in the study has been absolutely 
indispensable for a proper understanding of how the foundation influences innovation and policy. These 
secondary units of analysis include the WHO, research institutions, PDPs and PPPs. The Gates 
Foundation is closely tied to all of these and is even represented at board level on several of these 
While using the embedded case study approach it has been important to relate the findings back to 
the overall operations of the foundation, as prescribed by Yin (2009 P. 52). 
 
 
4.6 Data Sources 
As discussed extensively by Yin, case studies can be supported by several types of data. Furthermore it is 
seen as advantageous if one can utilize more than one source at once. Several sources can then 
supplement and strengthen each other. Documents can be employed to “corroborate and augment 
evidence from other sources”(Yin, 2009 p. 103). It has, in regards to the above statement, been an 
important part of the analysis to observe discrepancies or correlations between statements from interviews 
and the information given in documents, and to investigate these further.  
Initially annual reports and web resources from the Gates Foundation were vital in understanding 
the purposes and goals of the foundation. However, it is important to view these documents in light of 
being composed by the Gates Foundation. 
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4.6.1 Interviews 
As pointed out by Yin, the interview is one of the most important sources of information when 
performing case studies. For my interviews it was necessary to develop an interview guide that ties in 
with the overall objective of the paper. At the same time it was essential to develop the interview guide in 
such a way that it allowed for the development of ideas and conversation.  
The interviews took the form of focused, but open ended interviews to allow the interviewees to 
contribute their own insight and knowledge, and as a result the interviews often took unexpected, but 
useful turns. Two of the interviews were particularly free and unstructured. These two interviewees might 
therefore be seen as informants rather than respondents. They were the first ones to be interviewed and 
turned out to be extremely useful for the development of the thesis. However, it has been important for 
the sake of the integrity of the thesis to corroborate any information given by these two interviewees with 
other sources, such as journal papers and subsequent interviews. I have attempted, as far as possible, in 
conjunction with Yin‟s advice, to appear as naive to the topic as possible to avoid leading or swaying the 
interview. 
Yin (2009, p. 181) high-lights the importance of disclosing the identities of informants for the 
sake of critical review. It was natural to disclose the identity of the Gates Foundation for many reasons. It 
does not represent an ideal case so its identity is definitely of importance. Also, for the sake of open 
debate it is important that the unit of analysis is known to the reader. If not this thesis would to a certain 
degree lose its relevance. On the other hand, the identities of the informants are not disclosed. There are 
several reasons for this. Firstly, the Gates Foundation is topic of controversy, and negative statements 
might conceivably have a negative impact on the informer. Secondly, as the Gates Foundation is a 
significant funder of researchers and their institution I believe that anonymity could have a positive effect 
on the willingness to disclose sensitive or critical information about the foundation, on the part of the 
informant. 
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The interviewees were selected on the background of their position in regards to both their relation 
to the Gates Foundation and to the global health field. Some were also found through the method of 
snowballing. They came from a variety of backgrounds to secure a fair overview of the operations of the 
foundation. However, the thesis could have been strengthened by having performed more interviews from 
a wider variety of grant recipients; particularly, recipients of the Grand Challenges Exploration Program 
are not included. It would also been beneficial to have interviewed more than one representative from the 
Gates Foundation, but time constraints made this impossible. 
 The interviewees, who were all offered anonymity, were as follows: 
One representative from The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
Two representatives from the World Health Organization 
One representative from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
One previous board member of GAVI 
One representative from PATH 
Two representatives from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
One representative from Medicines for Malaria Venture 
Two individuals who have themselves studied the Gates Foundations over an extensive period  
One representative from the Norwegian Directorate of Health  
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5. Analysis and Discussion 
Analysis of the interviews was conducted, largely, on the basis of the questions posed earlier on. 
However, much unanticipated information was revealed through the interviews, and has contributed 
significantly to the end product. The research questions and the associated findings contribute to the 
overall picture of the thesis and is the foundation on which it is built. This has hopefully resulted in a 
logically structured thesis that is intuitive and easily read. 
The analysis of the operations of a foundation such as the Gates Foundation is of course difficult. 
It is further complicated by the fact that the Gates Foundation often operates and disseminates its money 
through the global partnerships with which it is involved, as with the Global Fund and GAVI where it is 
represented on the boards. Furthermore, actions taken by a given PPP might not always represent the 
views of the Gates Foundation. It has therefore been important to keep the activities of the foundation and 
the partnerships separate except in cases where the foundations influence has been obvious. 
This next section will discuss the findings with reference to the questions posed in the theory 
section. Finally, the overall purpose of this section is to relate back to the theory that was the basis for the 
formation of those questions, and the relevance to those theories will be examined. 
 
5.1 How does the Gates Foundation fund science, technology and innovation? 
This is obviously a complicated question to answer. The first and very obvious characteristic that 
is commented upon by all of my sources is that the foundation is extremely focused on scientific and 
technological development to combat diseases that have previously received too little attention, and on 
using existing technologies in new areas. This trait is also easily recognized from their grant portfolio, 
annual reports and web pages. The second point made by all of the interviewees is that the Gates 
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Foundation is exceptionally business oriented. This is something that is probably not entirely new to the 
field but, as the Gates Foundation is the largest private foundation in the world and undoubtedly the 
largest private funder of global health science and technology, it has definitely had a significant impact on 
orthodox thinking in this area. One source put it this way: 
 [The Gates Foundation and its partnerships] have broken down the traditional ways of 
doing business. They have combined research, governments, private sector in new and 
untried ways. They have harnessed the power of civil society in driving policy and 
engaging people. They have harnessed the non-public sector in the countries for 
implementations. 
As mentioned in the literature review it is assumed that foundations will lack a profit making 
incentive, but as mentioned by one of the interviewees, the Gates Foundation cooperates with many 
commercial actors and thus relies on profits to make investments into drugs for neglected diseases 
economically sustainable. It also indicates that the Gates Foundation has as discussed by 
Zimmermann(1999) been able to attract „the necessary factors of production‟, presumably because 
commercial actors such as the pharmaceutical companies have realized the possibility of expanding their 
markets. 
The recipients of Gates funds also portray the staff at the foundation as very knowledgeable, 
something that appears to enable them to be more collaborative throughout the grant period, from shaping 
of the milestones to the end product.  
One of the strategies of The Gates Foundation that seems directly linked to this business oriented 
way of thinking is, their Global Access Strategy. This is a strategy laid out mutually by the foundation 
and the grantee that explains how the funds provided can be accessed by those for whom the end-product 
is needed. In the words of the foundation‟s representative: 
Our goal is impact. So if it gets us through to a licensed product but it‟s not affordable 
you‟ve failed. If you get a cheap and licensed product but no one is going to manufacture it 
and deliver it in Botswana, you‟ve failed. If the goal is impact you have to work backwards 
from what it takes to get there. 
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Their attention to the milestones also appears to set the foundation apart, at least from funding 
agencies such as the NIH who focuses predominantly on publications. The Gates Foundation seems by 
contrast to have a broader concept of what the deliverables should comprise and is much more focused on 
concrete outcomes. This is in keeping with the objective of maximizing the impact of its interventions. 
This goal of impact can conceivably also function as an intrinsic incentive as replacement for a profit 
incentive, as per Zimmermann(1999). 
As the Gates Foundation funds myriad different initiatives this global access strategy can take 
many different forms. Gates money was an important factor in setting up the Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation at The University of Washington whose mission is to “monitor global health conditions 
and health systems and evaluate interventions, initiatives and reforms”(Ravishankar et al., 2009). Their 
deliverables will naturally be quite different from those of Product Development Partnerships, such as 
that of the Medicines for Malaria Venture. In the case of health metrics data, which is normally published 
through peer reviewed journals, the global access strategy has lead to innovative ways of thinking about 
dissemination of findings. For example, the Gates Foundation has in connection for some grants made it 
compulsory to produce software to process data on health metrics that can be used in developing 
countries. This poses a challenge to the IMHE, according to one of their representative, because the 
computational power conventionally needed for this type of software is often not present on location.   
The setting up of the IMHE could be seen as a significant contribution to global health science in 
itself. Data on the effectiveness of immunization initiatives in is often scarce and the amounts of money 
the IHME is receiving in way of Gates grants is, according to one of the IHME representatives, unusual 
for their line of work. However, while one source regards IHME as “impartial arbiters that are looking at 
statistics and trying to understand what is really happening” the concern is, as raised by another 
interviewee, that the IHME might run into a conflict of interest since it will also evaluate the effectiveness 
of Gates initiatives.   
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The Gates Foundation has also famously supported  and been instrumental in the setting up of 
large Private Public Partnership‟s like GAVI that focus on procurement of already existing interventions. 
GAVI is in itself not involved in development of vaccines but they were responsible for the establishment 
of the AMC mentioned earlier. The AMC was an initiative intended to drive the development of a new 
pneumococcal vaccine that is now in the pipeline. This is a very concrete example of how the funding of 
the Gates Foundation can create a market pull for new vaccines. The AMC was targeted specifically 
towards the production of a pneumococcal vaccine but it is not inconceivable that the money that has 
been made available through the Global Fund, UNICEF, GAVI and others signals to the pharmaceutical 
industry that there is a market for drugs against previously neglected diseases. 
  In accordance with Zimmermann‟s(1999) categories of output the Gates Foundation primarily 
aims at what he terms as „activities aimed at public goods‟, namely; „provision and production of public 
goods‟, and to a lesser extent; „support of public production‟.  The former is achieved through e.g. 
funding for procurement of established therapeutics or, where these don‟t exist, funding for research into 
drug development and diagnostics, etc (BMGF, 2010b). Of course the specific provisions made by the 
Gates Foundation are in strict economic terms not all public goods, hence not all are characterized non-
rivalrous consumption and nonexcludability (Stiglitz, 1993), such as with drug delivery. However, gains 
in scientific knowledge and communicable disease control do have the characteristics of public goods 
(Labonte & Schrecker, 2007). There is, however another side to the funding that the Gates Foundation 
provides. The Gates Foundation also makes wide use of the knowledge and expertise that exists in the 
private sector. The partnerships established with the for-profit sector imply that there is also an economic 
gain on their part, such as in the case of the AMC. The Gates Foundation‟s use of intellectual property 
rights to incentivize their partners is also interesting, and will be discussed later. 
The conclusion to this question is that The Gates Foundation has definitely taken part in shaping 
new models to finance global health science, but perhaps more importantly they have focused on 
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financing previously underfunded fields of science. So rather than just setting up new models of funding 
they have focused on funding areas that were previously neglected. 
  
5.2 How does the gates foundation use demand to direct their funding of science technology and 
innovation? 
This section looks at how the Gates Foundation uses demand signals to set priorities. It also deals with the 
systemic nature of innovation and how the system that the Gates foundation is part of is exploited to its 
fullest potential.  
Questions have been raised about how the Gates Foundation sets its priorities (McCoy, Kembhavi, 
et al., 2009; Raikes, 2010). This is still unclear, and the foundation‟s web pages offer little explanation 
except for broad references to „development and implementations of cost effective interventions‟, etc. In 
particular it is hard to understand how exactly the foundation decides upon specific project, or chooses 
one over the other. 
Looking at the burden of disease is one such way that the Gates Foundation can estimate the 
effectiveness of an intervention, were it to be developed. When asked about how the Gates Foundation set 
their priorities the representative from PATH said: 
Certainly one is looking at the global burden of disease and try and understand which 
diseases have significant burdens, that might be underrepresented in terms of investment  
technology development or investment in service delivery, and try and address those. 
Assessing the global burden of disease is a sound way of figuring out how many lives can be 
saved by an effective intervention but due to the unpredictability of the outcome of vaccines that have yet 
to be developed versus other interventions such as providing clean drinking water it is very difficult to 
assess the cost effectiveness of one over the other. 
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The Gates Foundation has as noted created consensus around the goal of eradicating Malaria with 
the support of the WHO. This is a very ambitious goal with high stakes. Interestingly, it seems to have 
come as a surprise to the scientific community as well as senior lieutenants within the WHO (Roberts & 
Enserink, 2007; Snow & Marsh, 2010). Furthermore, the eradication program has also received criticism 
for being less cost effective than a program of effective disease control. The momentum of this campaign 
seems to have created unrealistic optimism as seven African leaders have made it public that they will 
attempt to eradicate malaria in the next seven to ten years(Snow & Marsh, 2010), despite more modest 
timelines suggested by Bill Gates and others.(Feachem & Sabot, 2008; Roberts & Enserink, 2007)  
Furthermore, the two interviewees who had themselves studied the Gates Foundation reported that 
the African leaders had to be convinced of the plans to eradicate malaria. This exemplifies how it is 
sometimes unclear how the Gates Foundation sets its strategies. It appears that they did not employ the 
full extent of their network in deciding on this particular strategy, given that this announcement came as 
such a surprise to so many of the stakeholders. The Two had attempted to ask the Gates Foundation about 
the way they set priorities but had not gotten any answers, and added: 
When you ask them, how do they actually find their ideas, and how do those ideas get to 
them at any sort of grass root level, I don‟t think you‟ll see it. They are attending high level 
conferences all the time, their able to attract the best of the best researchers out there, who 
are all, you know, the top class in the field. But that is often not where some of the best 
innovations come from. 
It seems from their experience that most of their input comes from individuals in the upper 
echelon of the field who may or may not be an appropriate source of relayed information. In addition they 
pointed out that the Grand Challenges Exploration Program might be a way to access the ideas that exist 
outside the network the Gates Foundation has established and thereby balancing their advisory input. This 
also seems like a feasible approach to avoid a situation in which they would be „picking the winner‟ and 
at the same time help to avoid lock-in(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). However, given the communication 
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problems that the foundation is experiencing it might be difficult to make use of the opportunities that this 
program offers. 
One interviewee from a recipient organization who made it clear that his comments were made in 
a strictly personal capacity seemed insistent that the high quality analysis and policy discussions that take 
place in the foundation are not followed up with the same diligence and rigor. He summed up his view of 
the decision making process like this: 
The decision making time is always about a briefing of Bill and Melinda. And there is this 
sort of mysterious transformation a couple of weeks before that briefing takes place. Where 
all policy discussion, everything goes silent, and all you get is a one way street of asking 
for information to the foundation. There is never anything coming back from them and the 
way those questions come, you get the sense is that what‟s going on now, is not so much 
discussing “what is well founded, thought through policy?”, but “ what do we think it is 
that Bill and Melinda want to hear?”. And that is deadly. Because they don‟t get briefed, 
they don‟t get challenged on their thinking sufficiently. And the organization inhibits its 
own ability to think and I think that is really damaging. Also, the other element of this, for 
being a private institution run by someone so focused on return and investment and results 
The Gates Foundation has very little ability to measure the effectiveness of its own 
investments. There is hardly any way for The Gates Foundation to measure what it gets for 
its investment. It doesn‟t do it, and it doesn‟t tell anyone if it does. 
First of all this indicates that the internal communication at the foundation is not functioning as 
well as one could hope. In terms of a system framework for innovation this is disconcerting and not in 
line with the view of successful innovations being a product of a collective achievement as per Van de 
Ven(1999). It is interesting to note that an organization that seems so positively disposed towards free 
market mechanisms, and has had such success in putting them to use focuses so little on accessing 
information from the demand side. The information that the foundation will get from the recently formed 
IHME might to some extent alleviate some of these difficulties, particularly in relation to the quantitative 
information on the effectiveness of its interventions. 
Another interesting aspect of this is that GAVI, The Global Fund and the many other grantee 
organizations could be a way for the gates foundation to „hedge its bets‟ in terms of information about 
demand. As long as they spread their funds across multiple organizations with clearer governance and 
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better monitoring capabilities the foundation‟s need for information could be mitigated, especially when 
taking into account that a lot of these organizations are not only middlemen, but also users of the science 
and technologies that the Gates Foundation is supporting. 
  The Global Fund model of funding is such that funds are distributed among countries that procure 
the drugs themselves. They also have a Country Coordinating Mechanism in each of the recipient 
countries consisting of a variety of local and sometimes also international organizations that have 
exclusive access to finance from the Global Fund. Hence, in this instance, the money will be spent at a 
level much closer to the demand side than is often the case with Gates money. By improving the 
absorptive capacity of the foundation both internally and externally this network of information could 
presumably be put to much better use  
As a whole it seems that the Foundation generally operates along the lines of precisely such a 
sectoral system approach as outlined in the literature review, intentionally or not. They are keenly aware 
that they cannot take on the responsibility of global health challenges on their own, and say so. So to 
increase their impact, they have joined forces with both private and public actors, NGOs, FBOs and 
supra-national organizations. Furthermore, they are also devoted to influence policy, presumably to 
improve institutional arrangements and legal frameworks etc, as well as strengthening health systems. But 
it appears that there a piece of the puzzle missing. At the very least it is unclear how The Gates 
Foundation accesses information about demand that will allow them to make good decisions regarding 
their strategies. 
 
5.3 How does the Gates Foundation communicate with, and acquire information from their 
partners and grantees? 
This section is closely related to the previous one as they both have to do with the foundations ability to 
absorb information from its surroundings. This section will deal with how the foundation retrieves 
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information from its established system of grantees, while the previous mainly looked at how it accesses 
information external to that system and how this impact on the foundations priority setting. 
The Gates Foundation does appear to struggle with the communication between themselves and 
their grantees. The foundation has openly admitted to this, and has published a summary of their grantee 
perception report that was rather negative about the foundations communication efforts on their web 
pages. The CEO of The Gates Foundation, Jeff Raikes, wrote this in the summary: 
[W]e received lower than typical ratings on many other aspects of the grantee experience. 
Many of our grantee partners said we are not clear about our goals and strategies, and they 
think we don‟t understand their goals and strategies. They are confused by our decision-
making and grant making processes. Because of staff turnovers, many of our grantee 
partners have had to manage multiple Program Officer-transitions during the course of 
their grant, which creates more work. Finally, they say we are inconsistent in our 
communications, and often unresponsive. We take this feedback very seriously, because 
we understand that some of these barriers are preventing our partners and us from having 
our maximum impact. (Raikes, 2010) 
These views were, however, only to a limited extent echoed by the interviewees. Several 
mentioned the rapid growth of the foundation as a central cause of the communication difficulties, or that 
the program officers were so busy that they could be difficult to get a hold of. But the interviewees also 
seem to think it is improving. Most of the grantees interviewed point to a layered structure to the 
communication with The Gates Foundation. People at similar levels in the foundation and the recipient 
organizations will talk to each other. They will also interact at conferences, board meetings and other 
meetings hosted by a variety of organizations that operate in global health.  At PATH, however, they had 
found that making the meetings more formal helps to make the communication process easier:   
If we don‟t predetermine dates for the steering committees or the key decision makers to 
meet and talk about what the process is, then we run into scheduling issues and we also run 
into informal lines of communication which sometimes aren‟t as effective. 
So by and large, the respondents were fairly positive about the communication between 
themselves and the foundation.  
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There might be several reasons why there is a discrepancy between the findings in this thesis and 
the grantee perception report. One is that the grant recipient interviewees all work in organizations that 
receive substantial funding from the Gates Foundation; moreover, the Gates Foundation has board 
representation in several of these organizations. It seems natural that these organizations would receive 
more attention than many other grantees. On the other hand it is also natural that the interviewees would 
choose their words carefully when talking critically about The Gates Foundation.     
Another reason for this discrepancy could be the foundation‟s Grand Challenges Exploration 
Program. This is the project under the Global Health Program that supports innovative and early stage 
research initiatives with up to 100,000 USD – relatively small sums compared to other grants. There are 
more than 340 recipients of these grants around the globe (BMGF, 2010c). These could be the source of 
dissatisfaction in the grantee perception report as it is unlikely that they would receive as much attention 
from the Gates Foundation. However, more research is needed for more conclusive assessment. 
It is still worth discussing the possible negative impact that poor communication between the 
foundation and its grantees could have on innovation. In relation to theory the lack of communication 
documented in the Grantee perception report could lead to inferior results when it comes to innovation. 
The Gates Foundation is in a unique position with an incredibly diverse set of organizations and 
individuals tied to its operations. This should indicate that there is massive potential for absorption on 
new ideas. As the organization reportedly has problems assimilating the feedback from its partners, some 
of the potential that lies in this absorptive capacity is lost; indeed, this is noted by the CEO of The Gates 
Foundation in the quote above.  
To fully exploit the knowledge that originates with the grant recipients it would be useful for the 
foundation to employ Gate Keepers, as per Cohen and Levinthal(1990), to ease the process of absorption. 
As mentioned above, the Gates Foundation has received praise for being knowledgeable about the 
processes and technologies that they are investing in. This should indicate that the Gates Foundation has a 
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strong potential for increasing their absorptive capacity, as prior knowledge is a determinant of absorptive 
capacity. One interviewee also reported that he has to spend a lot of his time translating what they are 
doing into terms that employees at the foundation can understand. In this respect he might serve the 
position of a boundary-spanner well, but it is crucial that the information that is translated gets 
incorporated by the foundation. As pointed out by Cohen and Levinthal(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), R&D 
departments can have a positive impact on absorptive capacity. Making use an „external boundary 
spanners‟ such as the one mentioned here could be a way for the foundation to make use of the 
knowledge that originates within the R&D departments of other organizations 
That is to say that dissemination of information internal to the organization also needs to be 
prioritized. The statements from the quite critical quote in the previous section indicates that that crucial 
information is not always fed back to the three chairs, who are ultimately responsible for strategies. 
Whether this is a result of organizational culture or structural and organizational arrangement is not clear, 
but placing a greater focus on gatekeepers and boundary spanners would likely strengthen internal 
communication and allow for better evaluation of strategies.    
Ultimately, if the Foundation does not pay attention to these issues the advantage it has, given the 
strong knowledge base the foundation already possess, could be lost. As discussed in the literature 
review, absorptive capacity is path dependent, so if the foundation wishes to remain at the forefront of 
innovation in the global health field it needs to make sure that new knowledge is continuously absorbed. 
 
5.4 What characterizes the Gates Foundation’s STI policies and how do they affect the global 
health field? 
Having looked at The Gates Foundation‟s approach to financing global health, priority settings and finally 
absorptive capacity, this section will attempt to assess the policy implications of their operational methods 
including some of those discussed above. 
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The Gates Foundation‟s focus on scientific and technological discovery is well known, but it has 
also made very large funds available for the procurement of vaccines already available in the developed 
world. As several of the interviewees point out, their efforts to join forces with the for-profit sector they 
have arguably been able to create a market pull for new and cheaper vaccines, as well as driving the 
prices of existing vaccines down. 
However, the Gates Foundation has received a fair amount of criticism. It has been widely 
criticized for their relative lack of focus on health system strengthening, which could lead to the 
„medicines without doctors‟ syndrome (Ooms, Van Damme, & Temmerman, 2007) . Arata Kochi, the 
former director of the WHO Malaria Program criticized the foundation for pushing their policy 
recommendations through, despite reportedly not being able to prove their efficacy. He was also worried 
that the dominating role played by the Gates Foundation would stifle the diversity of research(McNeil, 
2008b). One head of a gates funded organization had according to a New York Times article joked that 
the target of malaria eradication had become “the new marching order” and “Go along with it if you want 
to get funded”(McNeil, 2008a).  
These remarks raise several issues. It appears from the responses from my sources that the Gates 
Foundation does fund health systems in a variety of ways, through the Global Fund, PATH and others, 
but it is clear from its Priority Areas of Focus(BMGF, 2010b) that this is not its primary mission. To what 
extent it funds health systems compared to other focus areas, and whether it is sufficient is not clear and 
deserves further attention. 
The accusations of steering and, directly or indirectly giving „marching orders‟ are serious. It 
could, as discussed in the literature review, be a hindrance to new and unsuspected solutions to problems. 
On the other hand, their attention to the Grand Challenges Exploration Program might be a very effective 
way of countering these effects, and allow for greater diversity in the science and technology that is 
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funded. It also seems to be a good way of avoiding the problems intrinsic to attempting to „pick the 
winners‟(Lundvall & Borrás, 2005), which is a very difficult task. 
Interestingly, when employing Lundvall and Borrás‟ framework of technology policy we see that 
the Gates Foundation uses both a catching up strategy and a strategy of employing the newest science 
based technologies – characteristics of low and high income countries respectively. This is seen in the 
way that it focuses on developing new vaccines and providing existing vaccines simultaneously. This is 
made possible by the large funds it possesses, and allows it pursue long term, ambitious strategies while 
using established technologies to combat certain diseases in a short term perspective. 
Another paradox of the Gates Foundation‟s funding policy is highlighted when using this 
framework. Lundvall and Borrás stated that governments could justifiably fund technologies of which 
they are themselves major user, but should be more cautious when developing technologies for the 
market. First of all, many of the very large users of technologies supported by the foundation are, not only 
recipients of Gates money but also to some degree guided by the Gates Foundation as it has board 
members on several of the recipients‟ boards. And in terms of the market, the Gates Foundation is to 
some extent the driving force of that market as it also funds the procurement of vaccines. So while 
innovation policy, according to Lundvall and Borrás, has mainly focused on economic growth and 
competitiveness and to a lesser extent social cohesion and equality, the Gates Foundation appears to be 
doing both  
The successful marshalling of support for eradication of malaria as an important target is an 
example of the penetrative force of the foundations policies. It might also be an example of how the Gates 
Foundation is infringing on the WHO‟s position as the normative agency in global health. One source 
adds that, “(…) it‟s clear that The Gates Foundation has huge influence over research priorities, research 
policies, research targets, what gets to the market, what doesn‟t get to the market”. 
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However, even if the Gates Foundation has historically made some moves that might be 
considered normative in nature, several sources state clearly that the diminishing role of the WHO is not 
caused by the introduction of Gates Foundation or others, but rather a problem inherent to the WHO. 
They blamed it on a lack of clear political leadership and mission within the organization. This view 
stands in clear contrast to the view held by McCoy and others. The extent to which the Gates Foundation 
is a threat to the WHO might also be overestimated through a crude comparison of their respective 
budgets which are comparable in size. However, the WHO dedicates very limited amounts of funding to 
research, nor is it particularly involved in procurement, and appears never to have seen that as its mission. 
As one source notes, there have always been many players in the global health arena, so the apparent 
diminishing role, according to him has to do with its political leadership. However, it seems justifiable to 
be concerned that other parties will move into the normative space in the absence of the WHO.    
The foundation‟s rather unusual ability to gather support from a diverse field of actors is supported 
by the statements of the interviewees, not only in policy but also in funding. Several of the persons 
interviewed remarked on their ability to create momentum around specific areas of funding; a 
phenomenon that is not usually seen when funding originates from states or other organizations.  One 
termed this the „multiplier effect‟ and added that while the Gates Foundation has, “invested billions of 
dollars in vaccines, (…) they have helped to raise maybe tens of billions of dollars for that same effort.” 
This multiplier effect has had a massive impact on health funding, and generated a lot of support 
for funding of previously neglected diseases. While this is appears to be one of the really great 
achievements of the foundation, the interviewees, from both inside and outside the organization sounded 
a note of caution: just as the Gates Foundation can create momentum when they enter into a field, the 
opposite applies when they leave a field. There is no evidence that this is true in the case of the Gates 
Foundation‟s initiatives, but the issue of disillusionment and donor fatigue when is well documented in 
studies of other programs(cf. Hardon & Blume, 2005). Another issue that deserves attention is whether 
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the consensus that the foundation can create around certain issues can lead to path dependency and 
eventually lock ins, as discussed by Lundvall and Borrás (2005 p. 611).   
Arguably, the foundations influence over policy, funding of science and technology and 
procurement, and their ability to, periodically set the agenda for global health in a significant way would 
normally entail some level of accountability and transparency.  
Now, to a degree the foundation might insure some accountability through funding organizations 
with much clearer leadership and mandate than the gates foundation itself, much in the same way they 
gather information. On one level this approach to funding counteracts the low level of accountability in 
the foundation by spreading it across multiple actors, but the main issue of priority setting remains. The 
Gates Foundation is still in a unique position when it comes to priority setting, possibly nearing a 
normative position in the world. And as remarked by the representative from the Norwegian Directorate 
of Health it is not clear who would stand accountable to failures of programs directed by PPPs as well. It 
is for example unclear who would be liable if a drug or vaccine should turn out to be harmful; the public 
or the private partners? The question of accountability and transparency will be revisited in the 
concluding remarks 
It is clear that the Gates Foundation does affect global health policy. To a degree it is positive that 
policy is shaped by a multiple actors as innovation is in this field, as in other fields, a communal 
achievement, as per Van de Ven (1999). The system view of innovation also recognizes the importance of 
representation of civil and private interest as a corrective influence to the bias in favor of commercial 
interests. The question is whether the Foundation has too much power over policy and science funding 
and whether it has, as I argued earlier, taken on the characteristics of states. 
If this is indeed the case, the Gates Foundation has to be wary of the implications this might hold 
for the direction of science technology and innovation. There is a danger that any one agency in such a 
position of power could steer the direction of STI in unfavorable directions. If the foundation has 
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hegemony over the priorities of e.g. malaria and they do not focus on diversity of opinions and research 
priorities it could lead to lock-ins and eventually inferior outcomes for the world‟s poorest.  
 
5.5 How does the gates foundation approach the principal agent problem? 
This topic is in some ways closely related to the previous topic of how The Gates Foundation funds 
science. The representative from The Gates Foundation describes the relationship between themselves (as 
the principal) and their grantees (as agents) as one of creative friction.   
The foundation will often release requests for proposals (RFP‟s). These can be broad RFP‟s but 
are more usually closed RFP‟s. This means that the foundation will select six to ten groups which will 
compete for a certain proposal. When deciding on a group to receive the grant milestones and deliverables 
are jointly decided upon by the foundation and the recipient. This is mentioned by several of my 
interviewees as an important method for successfully aligning the interests of both the foundation and the 
grantee. This process can conceivably lead to a sense of co-ownership of the projects and help to align the 
agent with the principle. 
All though this cooperative approach to the setting of milestones appears to work well for both 
parties, doing so entails an inherent principle agent problem of its own. There is according to one of the 
sources an incentive on the part of agent to make the milestones as routine and easily met as possible, 
while there is intent on the part of the foundation to make them seem substantive. In effect, the principle 
agent problem may simply manifest itself at an earlier stage. 
An interesting aspect of this relationship is exemplified by PATH‟s relationship with the 
foundation. When asked how they set their priorities their representative replied that they respond to their 
funders. This is put quite simply, but it seems that many recipients follow PATH‟s example of trying to 
align themselves as closely as possible to the objectives of the Gates Foundation, and do so quite 
comfortably. 
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Another example of how to align the recipients of the money to the funders is the AMC. As 
mentioned earlier the AMC is not a purely Gates funded initiative, but The Gates Foundation played an 
important part in its formation.  The funds for the AMC are not released until the product is ready for 
market. The AMC is a commitment to buy the product when it is finished. In this way the funders are 
assured that the producers will have to make a vaccine to their specifications before they procure it. This 
might be considered as a way of circumventing the principal agent problem all together. 
The foundation‟s somewhat creative use of intellectual property rights is mentioned by several of 
my sources and seems to work well as an incentive for cooperation with the foundation. The foundation 
appears to own none of the IPR‟s that come out of their partnerships. Neither do they appear to have one 
single strategy for how to deal with IPR‟s. Rather, the specific IPR requirements are worked out in 
relation to each grant, with the global access strategy as the core principle. This means that if the grantee 
is going to own intellectual property as a result of their funding they will have to present to the foundation 
how they will manage it to assure global access. This will in some cases mean that the grantee can offset 
the expenses associated with the development of a drug by selling them at market price in developed 
countries and license them cheaply in developing countries. According to the Gates representative it is 
more challenging with platform technologies that can be used to cure many different diseases as it will be 
desirable that this is open to scientists all over the world. This is how one representative from the IHME 
describes the foundations relationship to IPR: [T]hey want to ensure that there are mechanisms through 
whichever IP mechanism that is most appropriate to the individual project, that the deliverables have the 
widest disseminational uptake. 
It is interesting to see that the foundation has found that the relationship between the principal and 
the agent has creative potential. Even though it is not a frictionless relationship the very fact that there is 
tension between the two can in itself lead to new ways of working or thinking.  The way that the 
foundation deals with IPR‟s might be an example of that. 
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In practice, it seems that the Gates Foundation deals with the principal agent problem efficiently. 
It is possible that the cooperative shaping of milestones and deliverables in the contracts has caused a 
change the institutional embeddedness of scientists, as per Braun (2003). According to one source, the 
Gates Foundation has “helped make global health intellectually sexy”. It appears thus, that scientists 
deem the pursuits of the Gates Foundation to be academically worthy, and as such diminishes the danger 
of Moral hazard. 
 
6.Concluding remarks 
This section returns to the main research question of the thesis: How does the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation‟s Global Health Program influence innovation and innovation policy in global health 
governance? Relying on the analysis above I will try to draw some conclusions about the many ways that 
the foundation‟s Global Health Program has had an impact on innovation and innovation policy in the 
global health arena. I will also return to the question of transparency and accountability, before presenting 
some suggestions for further research. 
The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the foundation has had a massive impact in terms of 
funding into an area of much need. They have also, according to my sources been able to gather support 
and raise awareness for these causes. This is in fact one of their great achievements. The multiplier effect 
discussed earlier seems to have played a major part in sharp increase in global health funding observed in 
recent years. The multiplier effect does not merely apply to finance but to human resources to: according 
to one of my sources there has been a proliferation of interest among young doctors and scientists in 
matters of global health.  
There are some possible adverse consequences of the multiplier effect that also needs to be taken 
into consideration; what I have chosen to term the „reverse multiplier effect‟. As seen in previous major 
health initiatives, failure or negative results can result donor fatigue or disillusionment with a particular 
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health field. That this is already a concern of the Gates Foundation is illustrated by the concern that the 
Gates Foundation representative showed for the possible failure of the polio eradication program due to 
the severe adverse effects that this would have on all of the global health initiatives. 
First and foremost their contribution to innovation in the Global Health field seems to be in terms 
of institutional arrangements and relationships, such as those with The Global Fund, GAVI whose main 
aim it is to make already existing drugs, vaccines and other interventions available in developing 
countries. The support for the establishment of the IHME is another noteworthy contribution to the global 
health field, since it could in the future provide much better data on the effectiveness of interventions.  
In terms of scientific or technological development the foundations contribution is arguably more 
modest. There have been some breakthroughs, however. One example is the Meningitis A vaccine created 
by PATH in partnership with the WHO and help from the Serum Institute of India, made possible with 
Gates Funding. The relatively small contribution in this field has to be seen in the context of the age of 
the foundation. The foundations Global Health Program is now in its 13
th
 year. It generally takes more 
than ten years to develop a new vaccine and the real impact of the Gates Foundation‟s investments have 
probably not yet been realized. It will take several more years before a fair assessment of the effects of 
these investments can be made. 
The Gates Foundation has a paradoxical position in global health governance in that it represents 
one of the new actors in the field, leading to the fragmentation process that has taken place over a number 
of years. However, several of the interviewees contend that the foundation is also having a coordinating 
role. The H8 and the many conferences they attend and facilitate are examples of how this coordinating 
role is achieved in practical terms. If these attempts at coordination successful it could lead to a decrease 
in cost to developing countries that is associated with receiving DAH from multiple stakeholders    
They have also brought a diverse set of actors together in efforts to develop new vaccines, and 
been able to create operational links between their partners. Moreover, their co-coordinating role could 
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have a very positive effect on innovation in the global health field, since, as noted by Van de Ven(1999) 
notes, firms that “run in packs will be more successful than those that develop their innovations alone”. 
This means that the Gates Foundation‟s approach could be beneficial to both industry and those who 
require drugs and therapeutics. Hence, the operations of the Gates Foundation could in effect help to 
decrease the level of confusion regarding policymaking in global health, as discussed by Reich and 
Takemi(2009).  
The Gates foundation has successfully established ties to both public and private actors, and 
managed to engage a very large amount of actors to achieve their goals and stimulate innovation. Their 
focus is unusually broad and while concentrating on scientific and technological advancement they are 
also concerned with institutional arrangements and health systems strengthening. Its operational methods 
reflect, to a great extent, the systemic view of innovation. However there is an apparent lack of 
communication. Using gate keepers and boundary spanners more actively to improve the absorptive 
capacity of the foundation would conceivable give the demand side more say over the priorities of the 
foundation 
It is difficult to overstate the influence of the Gates Foundation. Even though some of the elements 
of the discussion surrounding fragmentation, and especially the accusations of infringements on the 
WHO‟s territory can be lied to rest, the Gates Foundation remains as one of the very few if not the only 
organization that can exert significant influence over nearly every major global health initiative, and is 
free to influence research, spending and delivery policy where ever it is represented by a board member. 
Thus, as pointed out by one of my sources, regardless of if the problems pointed out by Arata 
Kochi(McNeil, 2008b) actually happened; the dynamics for such occurrences are still very much in place. 
I will now briefly return to the question of transparency and accountability. The Gates Foundation, 
despite the large amount of information made available through annual reports and its web pages remains 
fairly nontransparent when it comes to setting priorities and choosing strategies. This is made clear by 
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several of the interviewees quoted above as well as by the grantee perception report made public on the 
Gates‟ web pages. 
As noted by several interviewees the Gates Foundation is largely concerned with an inwards 
accountability; they are largely accountable to themselves and their funders, mainly Warren Buffet and 
Bill Gates. The Gates Foundation representative also point out their accountability towards the IRS (The 
Internal Revenue Service). But there is no specific reference to how they might be accountable to the 
larger community.  
The Gates Foundation is of course a private foundation funded with private money; it does not 
have a board and is in practice controlled by the three co-chairs of the foundation. The Gates Foundation 
is not obliged in any way to disclose how they set their priorities and any information that they do give to 
that effect, through their web pages or other media is entirely at their own prerogative. Hence, a demand 
for transparency and accountability might not hold much weight with the foundation, and one might ask 
the question why it should. Still, this issue has received some attention in the case of the Gates 
Foundation. This is presumably a result of the foundation‟s central position in global health governance, 
but also because of the influence its vast resources can command. The Foundation is by no means a 
typical private donor in this respect. Thus, the impact of their strategic priorities stretches beyond their 
immediate clients and they arguably have a moral, if not a legal duty to be transparent about these. 
Nelson and Winter note that “an evolutionary view of what is going on in the world of firms and 
industries strongly influences how one looks at the question of what should be going on” and that “the 
normative economic problem is seen in terms of characterizing the point within the set that maximizes 
social welfare(Nelson & Winter, 1982 p. 355)”. In this context the normative argument of accountability 
and transparency is justifiably extended to the Gates Foundation. In a sense one could see accountability 
as only being necessary when things go wrong, but at the same time accountability can a priori ensure the 
avoidance of reckless behavior. Hence, transparency and accountability should be seen parts of the 
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systemic set up that can ensure the maximization of social welfare through innovative activities. A more 
open organization whose priorities setting is transparent might also benefit in terms of absorptive capacity 
 
6.1 Suggestions for further research 
 
This thesis has provided a broad overview of the foundation‟s approach to influence innovation, but much 
more work is obviously needed. More research needs to be done into the efficiency of communication 
between the Gates Foundation and its grantees. This will be particularly interesting as it represent a 
concern for the foundation, and one that they are said to be working to improve. With respect to 
absorptive capacity it would be interesting to investigate whether, or to what extent, the Gates Foundation 
utilizes gatekeepers and boundary spanners, and by what means they assimilate and disseminate 
information.  
 Similarly, it would be interesting to learn more about the foundations way of utilizing demand as 
input for decision making. This, however, is closely tied to the foundations willingness to impart 
information about this process and such a study would be dependent on more transparency. 
There is also a need for further research into the effects of the foundation‟s STI policies, both in 
terms of dissemination of products but also processes, services and organizational 
innovations(cf.Lundvall & Borrás, 2005 p. 616). A comparative quantitative study could further our 
understanding of the effectiveness of their strategies, and perhaps indicate whether the communication 
difficulties have had a negative impact on innovation.  
It seems that the Gates Foundation has been successful in their approach to problems related to the 
principal agent relationship. Comparative analyses of other foundations would in this respect be 
interesting, to see whether they employ similar strategies to align their goals with those of their grantees.  
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8. Appendix  
 
Appendix I 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
AMC – Advanced Market Commitment  
DAH – Development Assistance for Health 
FBOs – Fate Based Organizations 
GAVI – Formerly the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
MMV – Medicines for Malaria Venture 
NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations 
NPOs – Non-Profit Organizations 
PATH – Program for Appropriate Technology in Health 
PDPs– Product Development Partnerships  
PPPs – Public Private Partnerships 
The Global Fund – The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 
UNICEF – United Nations International Children‟s Emergency Fund 
WHO – World Health Organization 
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Appendix II 
Interview Guide for external sources. 
 
Could you please give a short description of your organization, and your role in it? 
 
Does your organization receive funding from the Gates Foundation? 
 -For what? 
 - For how long 
 - How much? 
What sorts of conditions are tied to this funding? 
- Reporting requirements? 
- Dissemination of results? 
- IPR 
- How are they monitored? 
How do these requirements influence the activities in your organization? 
How do you communicate with the Gates Foundation? 
- How often? 
- On what level? 
How easy is it to communicate with the Gates Foundation? 
- Is it easy to exchange views and opinions? 
How has the Gates Foundation dealt with the principal agent problem? 
- Incentivizing? 
- Adverse selection? 
- Moral Hazard? 
Are provisions made for capacity building in developing countries? 
- Is funding tied to health system strengthening? 
What would you say characterizes the policies of the Gates Foundation? 
- How do they set their priorities? 
- Have they had an impact? 
What would you say is the greatest achievement of the Gates Foundation? 
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Appendix III 
Interview Guide for the Gates Foundation. 
 
Could you please give a short description of your organization, and your role in it? 
How is funding from the Gates Foundation given to recipients? 
- Open/closed RFPs?  
- Open solicitation? 
- Funding rounds for running of organizations such as GAVI and the Global Fund? 
What sorts of conditions are tied to this funding? 
- Reporting requirements? 
- Dissemination of results? 
- IPR 
- How are they monitored? 
How are the developments in science and technology that the Gates Foundation support translated into 
products that benefit the end user? 
How does the Gates Foundation assess demand? 
How do you communicate with the recipients? 
- How often? 
- On what level? 
How easy is it to communicate with the Gates Foundation? 
- Is it easy to exchange views and opinions? 
How do you deal with the principal agent problem? 
- Incentivizing? 
- Adverse selection? 
- Moral Hazard? 
Are provisions made for capacity building in developing countries? 
- Is funding tied to health system strengthening? 
What would you say characterizes the policies of the Gates Foundation? 
- How do you set your priorities? 
- Have they had an impact? 
What would you say is the greatest achievement of the Gates Foundation? 
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What are the Greatest challenges facing the global health field? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
